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Commentary
The Value of Narrative in Legal Scholarship
and Teaching
Jean C. Love*
Storytellingl-particularly storytelling written from an "outsider's"
perspective2-is a new form of legal writing that appears with increasing
frequency on the pages of law reviews and specialized legal journals.3 At the
same time, critics are questioning whether storytelling deserves to be classified
as a form of legal scholarship.4 Perhaps storytellers are to be regarded as 
talented and creative writers, but do they truly deserve to be called legal
scholars? At first, the debate was local, arising in the context of the
deliberations of appointments committees and tenure committees.5 Now the
* J.D., University of Wisconsin, 1968; Professor of Law, University of California-Davis (1972-
91); Professor of Law, University of Iowa (1991-present). I would like to thank my partner, Pat Cain, who
encouraged me to dive into these unfamiliar waters. I would also like to thank my research assistants, Julie
Amador and Yvonne Yung, who kept me from drowning. 
1. The first symposium on "storytelling" appeared in 1989. Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989). 
2. For an earlyexample of "outsider" scholarship, see DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 
(1987). Richard Delgado has defined "outsiders" as members of "outgroups," those groups whose
"marginality defines the boundaries of the mainstream, whose voice and perspective-whose
consciousness-has been suppressed, devalued, and abnormalized." Richard Delgado, Storytelling for 
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2412 (1989). See generally
Mary I. Coombs, Outsider Scholarship: The Law Review Stories, 63 U. COLO.L. REv. 683 (1992).
Mari Matsuda coined the phrase "looking to the bottom" to describe the process of "adopting the
perspective" of those who have experienced discrimination. Mari J. Matsuda, Laoking to the Bottom:
Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 324 (1987). Today, an
alternative description of "outsider's stories" is "stories from the bottom." Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna
Sheny, Telling Stories Out ofSchool: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN.L. REv. 807, 824 (1993). 
"Outsider" scholarship is often written by feminists and members of racial minority groups. Partly
for that reason, questions have always been raised as to whether it is taken seriously. See e.g., Patricia A. 
Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REv. 19, 30 (1991); Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1349,
1360-61 (1992). 
3. For an excellent overview of this body of legal scholarship, see Kathy Abrams, Hearing the
Call ofStories, 79 CAL.L. REv. 971 (1991).
4. Jane B. Barron, Resistance to Stories, 67 S. CAL.L. REV. 255 (1994); See, e.g., Farber & 
Sheny, supra note 2; Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques ofLegal Academia, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1745
(1989). 
5. See generally Kathryn Abrams, The Narrative and the Nonnative in Legal Scholarship, in
REPREsENTING WOMEN 44, 54 n.9 (Susan Sage Heinzelman & Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman eds., 1994).
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88 The Journal of Race, Gender & Justice [2: 1998]
debate is national, and it is being conducted on the pages of the most
prestigious law journals.6 
I have been asked to comment on two papers written in the narrative
tradition. One is a true story told by a transgendered economics professor.7 The
other is a fictionalized story told by a black female law professor.8 Given the
heated nature of the debate over whether storytelling constitutes legal
scholarship, it may be a relief to learn that each of these two storytellers is
tenured.9 Therefore, neither of their careers is dependent upon the outcome of 
the debate. Nevertheless, I would like to take this opportunity to locate each of 
their stories within the framework of the debate.
There is general agreement that legal cases are "stories" and that ''the
common law" emerges from the judicial resolution of "cases and
controversies."lo Most law schools teach by the "case method,,,11 and most
casebooks are filled with ''true stories," although sometimes law professors
write "fictionalized stories" for classroom discussion, such as the "Case of the
Speluncean Explorers.,,12 Traditional law review articles are expected to
describe legal cases, analyze appellate opinions, and propose sound solutions
to the thorny problems raised by "real world" controversies.13 Given the general
agreement that "cases" are central both to making law and teaching law, why
is there such a vigorous debate over the propriety of "storytelling" as a form of 
legal scholarship?
The crux of the problem seems to be that "storytellers" are speaking from
their own personal experiences, rather than talking about other peoples' lives, 
as depicted in legal cases.14 But why is it so worrisome to many members of the
6. For responses to Farber and Sherry's article, supra note 2, see e.g., Richard Delgado, On
Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farber & Sherry, 46 VAND. L. REv. 665 (1993); William N.
Eskridge, Jr., GayLegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REv. 607 (1994); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the
Use of Narrative and Giving Content to the Voice ofColor: Rejecting the Imposition ofProcess Theory 
in Legal Scholarship, 79 IOWAL. REv. 803 (1994). For responses to Kennedy's article, supra note 4, see 
Scott Brewer, Colloquy-Responses to Randall Kennedy's Racial Critiques ofLegal Academia, 103 
HARv. L. REv. 1844 (1990).
7. Dierdre McCloskey, Happy Endings: Law, Gender, and the University, 2 J. GENDER RACE
&JUST. 77 (1998). 
8. Dorothy A. Brown, The LSAT Sweepstakes, 2 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 59 (1998).
9. Dierdre McCloskey is a tenured professor in the Department of Economics at the University 
ofIowa. Dorothy Brown is a tenured professor at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
10. Farber & Sherry, supra note 2, at 807.
11. Edwin W. Patterson, The Case Method in American Legal Education: Its Origins and 
Objectives, 4 J.LEGALEDUC. 1 (1951).
12. Lon Fuller, The Case ofthe Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. REv. 616 (1949). 
13. See generally Edward L. Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A Theory for Evaluating Legal 
Scholarship, 80 CAL.L. REv. 889 (1992).
14. Farber & Sherry, supra note 2, at 808.
    
   
 
  
      
 
 
    
    
 
  
  
 
 
      
    
   
    
 
 
  
   
  
  
    
   
  
 
    
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
       
 
   
       
 
    
  
     
     
      
 
 
    
   
 
   
        
  
    
   
 
  
    
 
    
   
  
 
    
    
    
 
    
    
    
     
    
 
 
   
         
     
     
   
  
    
 
 
      
 
       
     
         
      
 
       
       
  
       
 
  
  
      
       
     
   
      
    
   
     
        
    
  
      
      
  
    
   
   
    
    
    
       
       
  
    
       
   
   
    
          
    
          
           
           
      
 
     
           
        
          
          
       
        
        
        
         
 
       
        
  
 
    
          
       
          
  
 
     
       
          
       
 
      
       
   
  
   
         
 
  
  
  
     
             
  
  
             
                 
               
       
The Value o/Narrative in Legal Scholarship and Teaching 89
legal academy that storytellers speak from their own personal experiences?
First, there is a concern about the ''validity'' or ''truthfulness'' of stories that
appear in narratives. IS Second, even if a story is ''true,'' there is a concern that
it may not be ''typical'' of real world experiences.16 Finally, even if a story is
both "true" and ''typical,'' there is a concern that it may not contain "legal
analysis," which is the "hallmark of legal scholarship.,,17 Rather, it may be
purely "emotive,,18 in a way that will not "invite reply.,,19 
Why must a storyteller tell a ''true'' and ''typical'' story followed by "legal
analysis"? The argument goes as follows: If the traditional legal scholar is
expected to describe ''true'' and ''typical'' cases, subject them to "rigorous legal
analysis," and then propose reforms that are developed from a "systematic, not
anecdotal [perspective],,,20 then the storyteller who substitutes a "story" for a
"legal case" oUght to be held to the same high scholarly standards.21 
How do storytellers respond to this demand for uniform scholarly
standards? Some storytellers offer no resistance. They are comfortable
conforming to the traditional norms.22 For example, Professor Susan Estrich
opens her Yale Law Review article on rape with her own personal story of being
a rape victim.23 Then she moves into a traditional format, first discussing and
analyzing rape statutes and cases, and then advancing a carefully crafted
proposal for rape law reform.24 Her story does not serve as a "substitute" for
legal cases. Rather, her story tells the reader why she has developed an interest
in this particular area of the lawS and puts the reader on notice that her legal
analysis may be informed, at least in part, by her own real-world experiences.26 
15. Abrams, supra note 3, at 978-79, 1020-28; Farber & Sherry, supra note 2, at 831-38. 
16. Abrams, supra note 3, at 979·80, 1028-30; Farber & Sherry, supra note 2, at 838-40. 
17. Farber & Sherry, supra note 2, at 846, 849.
18. Id. at 849.
19. Id at 850.
20. Id at 838·39 (quoting Owen M Fiss, Reason in All itsSplendor, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 789, 803 
(1990».
21. Id. at 846.
22. Abrams, supra note 3, at 983·87.
23. Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALEL.J. 1087 (1986).
24. Id For a more recent article on rape written in a similar style, see Katherine Lusby, Hearing
the Invisible Women 0/ Political Rape: Using Oppositional Narrative to Tell a New War Story, 25 U. 
TOL.L. REv. 911 (1995).
25. Abrams, supra note 3, at 983.
26. Id After Susan Estrich wrote her path·breaking "introductory" narrative, see Estrich, supra
note 23, other feminist scholars began to blend their stories with their legal analysis. Abrams, supra note 
3, at 987-95 (commenting on Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images o/Battered Women: Redefining the Issue 
o/Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991)).
   
  
  
 
  
  
  
   
 
 
   
  
    
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
  
  
  
 
    
  
 
  
  
 
  
    
   
   
 
   
   
   
  
    
    
  
   
 
   
  
 
 
  
  
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
   
 
  
 
   
    
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
    
   
    
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
   
   
 
 
     
  
  
   
   
 
  
  
 
  
    
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
   
   
    
  
   
  
  
   
    
 
  
  
   
 
  
 
  
 
   
   
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
   
   
   
    
   
 
 
    
    
  
   
  
  
  
    
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
 
 
    
 
 
  
  
   
  
   
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
          
        
            
            
          
            
        
             
             
             
         
           
        
 
           
           
            
        
     
 
         
       
   
 
       
         
      
      
    
      
     
    
  
      
   
 
       
  
        
          
      
     
   
      
        
  
    
 
    
90 The Joumal ofRace, Gender & Justice [2:1998]
Other storytellers express a willingness to adhere to the nonns of legal
scholarship if (but only if) their topic can be properly developed within the
confines of the traditional fonnat. For example, William Eskridge, an openly
gay male law professor, readily acknowledges the value of telling stories within
the traditional mode.27 However, he simultaneously defends the occasional
necessity of turning to pure storytelling, as when legal refonn appears to be
unattainable unless and until there has been a "rupturing" of the societal "status
quO.,,28 Thus, he suggests that a gay law professor might tell a personal story of 
being the victim of employment discrimination,29 followed by a traditional,
rigorous legal analysis of the application of equal protection principles to
governmental discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation post-Romer.30 
But that same gay law professor, confronting the universal prohibition on same­
sex marriage, might find it necessary to engage in pure storytelling,31 hoping
that his stories would enable the reader to identify a sufficient number of 
commonalities between opposite-sex and same-sex intimate relationships to
warrant a change in the law.32 
Finally, some storytellers steadfastly refuse to confonn to the nonns of 
traditional legal scholarship.33 Professor Patricia Williams, for example, has 
written entire books of stories34 based on her life experiences as a black woman
who is a "victim" of discrimination, an "observer" of discrimination, and a
silent "collaborator" in discrimination.35 Her stories "depict the human
27. Eskridge,Jr., supra note 6, at 61 1-21. 
28. [d. at 631-44. 
29. Eskridge first tells the story of Perry J. Watkins, a gay man who was discharged by the
military. [d. at 611-21. Eskridge then identifies himself as a gay law professor who was denied tenure at
the University of Virginia. [d. at 644.
30. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
31. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History a/ Same- Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L REv. 1419 (1993). A
revised and expanded version of this article appears in WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME­
SEX MARRIAGE IS-50 (1996).
32. Eskridge emphasizes that "gay law provides a particularly attractive field for narratives"
because society has not yet accepted same-sex intimate relationships. Eskridge, Jr., supra note 6, at 610. 
See also Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes. 
andLegal Protection/or Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 5II (1992). See generally the list
of books and law review articles containing "gaylesbian narratives" that appears in Eskridge, Jr., supra
note 6, at 609 n.12.
33. The work of these storytellers is described by Abrams in several of her pieces on narrative
legal scholarship. Abrams, supra note 3, at 995-1012; Abrams, supra note 5, at 45-46; Kathryn Abrams,
Narrative, Unity andLaw, 13 STUD. L POL. &SOC'y 3 (1993) (discussing the increased use of narratives
in law). 
34. See. e.g., PAlRICIAJ. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OFRACEANO RIGHTS (1991); PAlRICIAJ.
WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG (1995). 
35. Abrams, supra note 3, at 1001.
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The Value ofNarrative in Legal Scholarship and Teaching 9 1  
condition,,36 in all of its complexities, but they offer no concrete specifications
for legal reform.37 Rather, they are "paradigm-shifting" narratives.38 Such
narratives "are offered when, in the view of the author, the legal system has
reached an impasse: the law has progressed to the limits of what it can
accomplish, given an ingrained conception of a particular problem; before it 
can move again, it is necessary that some reconceptualization take place.,,39
Paradigm-shifting narratives speak less to "legal problems" and more to
"unacknowledged injuries.'>40 Law professors who write such scholarship "take
the . . .  position that what persuades decisionmakers to embrace new legal rules
is not, or not only, the abstract elegance of a proposed solution,'>41 but rather "a 
more visceral response: a response animated by a particularized depiction of the
lives of those affected by a legal rule.,,42 
The two presentations that you just heard were "paradigm-shifting"
narratives.43 Both speakers told "stories from the bottom,,44-one with a
profound stutter, and the other with a keen sense of humor.45 Both stories were
based on real life experiences, although one was "true,,46 and the other was
"fictionalized.,,47 Neither speaker offered a legal solution, and yet each story
was developed within a "legal framework,',48 and each story was told to you in
your capacity as a student of the law. The hope of each speaker was that, as you
listened to her story, you would experience a paradigm shift that would enable
you to think more creatively about how to solve the intractable problems of 
discrimination based on race and gender identity.49
36. [d. at 1002.
37. [d. at 1004.
38. [d. at 1034; Abrams, supra note 5, at 50.
39. Abrams, supra note 5, at 50.
40. [d. at 53.
41. [d. at 52.
42. [d. 
43. Dorothy A. Brown, The !.SAT Sweepstakes, Speech at The Journal ofGender, Race & Justice 
Symposium, From Class to Community: Reading Our Rights, Writing the Wrongs (Oct. 34, 1997);
DierdreMcCloskey, The Anxious Law of Gender: A Novice Woman's View, Speech at The Journal of
Gender, Race & Justice Symposium, From Class to Community: Reading Our Rights, Writing the
Wrongs (Oct. 34,1997).
44. See my earlier discussion of the phrase "stories from the bottom," supra note 2.
45. Brown, supra note 8.
46. McCloskey, supra note 7.
47. Brown,supra note 8.
48. Abrams, supra note 3, at 1030.
49. See supra text accompanying notes 3842.
     
  
   
 
  
   
 
  
   
   
  
    
  
 
  
  
   
 
 
   
  
  
 
 
    
   
 
  
  
  
   
 
 
 
   
 
  
  
    
   
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
   
  
 
   
 
  
    
 
  
  
 
  
     
 
  
         
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
     
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
    
 
 
   
  
   
  
  
    
 
  
   
  
    
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
    
 
   
  
  
 
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
   
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
  
   
  
 
 
 
     
 
    
    
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
   
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
  
  
    
 
   
 
  
    
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
   
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
    
 
   
 
 
  
 
   
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
  
 
   
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
    
  
   
 
          
 
        
     
          
           
         
          
      
            
            
     
         
    
 
   
            
       
 
  
          
              
            
            
             
             
             
            
            
          
          
              
              
              
              
           
 
              
               
     
     
       
                
                
                
    
                
                
               
                
              
             
92 The Journal of Race, Gender & Justice [2: 1998]
Given the paradigm-shifting objectives of these two papers, let me begin
by asking you a question: What did you learn from listening to these stories that
you would not have learned from listening to more traditional scholarly
presentations? What did you learn from Dorothy Brown's "fictional story" that
you would not have learned had she objectively dissected the pros and cons of 
using the LSAT in law school admissions?50 And what did you learn from
Dierdre McCloskey's "true story" that you would not have learned had she
conducted an economic analysis of the costs and benefits of adopting an
ordinance that prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender identity?51
One of the most-valued benefits of "storytelling" is that the listener is able
to empathize with the narrator.52 For example, as we in the audience listened to
Professor McCloskey's story, we were able to walk in her high-heeled shoes for
a few moments, feeling her discomfort and pain.53 Similarly, we were
transported to heightened levels of empathy by Professor Brown's fiction. She
did not simply enable those of us who are white to walk a mile in her shoes. 
Instead, she reversed the roles of blacks and whites and told those of us who are
white to walk a mile in our own new shoes. She let us feel our own blisters! For
a moment, we were the ones with an average LSAT score of 140, and she was
part of the group with an average LSAT score of 150.54 How did we react? Did
we say that the test had a disparate impact on whites? Did we say that the test
was biased?55 Did we say that grades are a better predictor of law school
performance than the LSAT?56 Did we say that submission of LSAT scores
should now be voluntary? Did we say that law school admissions committees
should now read the files, including personal essays, instead of admitting
50. For a recent statement by the President and Executive Director of the Law School Admission
Council as to the pros and the cons of using the LSAT in the law school admissions process, see Philip
D. Shelton, The LSAT: Good-But Not That Good, AALS NEWSL., Nov. 1997, at 10-11.
51. For an example of the application of economic analysis to nondiscrimination legislation, see
RICHARDA. EPS1EJN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAws
(1992).
52. See generally Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH.L. REv. 1574 (1987);
Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule oflAw: New Words, Old Wounds?, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2099 (1989).
53. McCloskey, supra note 7. 
54. Brown, supra note 8, at 59.
55. See, e.g., Leslie G. Espinoza, The LSAT: Narratives and Bias, 1 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 121 
(1993). See also Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis
ofthe Consequences ofAbandoning Race as a Factor in lAw SchoolAdmission Decisions, 72 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1 (1997).
56. Studies comparing the predictive value of the SAT and high school grades suggest that the
SAT adds very little, if anything, to the predictive value of undergraduate grades. William Beaver, Is It 
Time to Replace the SAT?, 82 ACADEME 37, 38 (May-June 1996). Law School Admissions Council
studies show that the LSAT alone has more predictive value than undergraduate grades alone, but that a
combination of the LSAT and undergraduate grades usually has the highest predictive value. Shelton,
supra note 50, at 10; Wightman, supra note 55, at 29-34 & n.63.
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The Value ofNarrative in Legal Scholarship and Teaching 93 
students by the computer?57 Did we say that the LSAT should be thrown out?!S8 
By giving us a new pair of shoes to wear, Professor Brown challenged us to
develop a different perspective on the intractable problems surrounding law
school admissions.
Just as I was about to experience a paradigm-shifting flash of insight
regarding the law school admissions process, my concentration was broken, and
I was back in my own, old, flat-heeled, wide, comfortable shoes. What had
happened to break my chain of concentration? Well, as I had been holding my
imaginary cup of coffee and reading Professor Brown's "fictionalized"
headline,s9 I had been reminded of a "real-world" headline that I had read in the
New York Times about two years ago: ''Men Found To Do Better in Law School
than Women.,,60 I was initially shocked when I first read that New York Times
heading. Now, in retrospect, I realized that that experience had qualified as a
paradigm-shifting moment in my own professional life.61 Truth is indeed
stranger than fiction, and sometimes just as powerful.
And why was I so shocked when I first read the New York Times headline?
Most likely because I had started law school in 1965, when society doubted that
women could be good law students, and yet I had graduated at the top of my
class. Moreover, a female student in the class one year ahead of me had
graduated at the top of her class as well.62 I had been teaching for over twenty
years, and I had not noticed that men had outperformed women in any of my
classes. Could the headline be true? My disbelief drove me to do an empirical
study of the performance of male and female students at the University of Iowa
College of Law in the Class of 1993.63 My findings showed that men and
57. Su, e.g., Leigh H. Taylor, A Faulty and Narrow Understanding ofMerit and Qualification 
in University Admissions, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Sept. 15, 1995, a! B3 (criticizing the overreliance on
standardized test scores and grades in the law school admission process and emphasizing the importance
of nonnumerical factors). 
58. Brown, supra note 8, a! 71.
59. Professor Brown's headline reads: "Blacks Outscore Whites on LSAT: Lawsuit Threatened,"
supra note 8, a! 59.
60. Laura Mansnerus, Men Found to do Better in Law School than Women, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 10,
1995, a! A25. The newspaper article summarized a law review article presenting the findings of a survey
of male and female students enrolled a! the University of Pennsylvania School of Law. See also Lani
Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League lAw School, 143 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1 (1994). The study found "strong academic differences between graduating men and women" 
despite "identical entry-level credentials." Id. a! 3. The authors argued thai the statistics were evidence
of a "chilly climate" for women in the classroom. Id. a! 34.
61. The experience caused me to write an article addressed to law school deans encouraging them
to conduct "local" studies on the status of women in their law schools. Jean C. Love, Twenty Questions
on the Status ofWomen Students in Your lAw School, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S W. 405 (1997).
62. 1d. at 406.
63. 1d. 
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women were comparably qualified at the time of admission to law school,64 and
that they performed comparably well both during their law school careers6S and
at the time of graduation.66 The Class of 1993's headline should have said:
"Women Found To Do As Well in Law School As Men," or "Men Found To
Do As Well in Law School as Women,,!67 
Once I had proven that my instincts were correct, I paused to reflect upon
the value of statistical studies that compare two groups of people, such as
women and men, or blacks and whites. I realized that there are only three
possible findings:
1. X does better than y.68
2. Y does better than X.69
3. X and y perform comparably.70
Given the fact that the release of such statistics will inevitably emphasize the
differences between the sexes (or the races), we must be certain that the
benefits of publishing such information will outweigh the costs. In the case of 
law school "gender" studies, I am convinced that annual "local" law school
surveys are a very cost-effective means of monitoring a particular law school's
educational environment so as to ensure that the climate does not become a
"chilly" one for women.71 Carl Monk, the Executive Director of the Association
of American Law Schools, agrees with me.72 Publishing the results of "race"
studies may be more problematic because the statistical differences often are
larger and appear to be less subject to change.73 But then, of course, that is why
64. Id. at 408 & n.9. 
65. Id. at 408 & n.lO. 
66. Id. at 409 & n.11.
67. Headlines announcing the results of local gender studies are now beginning to appear. Su,
e.g., Chris Klein, New Studies: Female Students Do Just as Well as Men-Or Better, NAT'LLJ., Sept.
22, 1997, at A20. 
68. See, e.g., Guinier et. al, supra note 60 (stating that men perform better than women at the
University of Pennsylvania School of Law).
69. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 67 (stating that women perform better than men at the University
of Dayton School of Law). 
70. See, e.g., Love, supra note 61 (stating that women perform as well as men at the University
of Iowa College of Law). 
71. Id. at 411. 
72. Carl Monk mailed my ''Twenty Questions" to the deans of AALS member schools in the 
summer of 1996. See also Carl C. Monk, The Experiences ofWomen in Legal Education, AALS NEWSL., 
Mar. 1996, at 5. 
73. See, e.g., Stephen P. Klein & Roger Bolus, The Size and Source ofDifferences in Bar Exam 
Passing Rates Among Racial and Ethnic Groups, B. ExAMINER, Nov. 1997, at 8; Wightman, supra note
55. 
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Professor Brown's "fictionalized narrative" has such paradigm-shifting power.
She asks us to imagine what we have not yet experienced: "Blacks Outscore
Whites on LSAT.,,74 
Professor McCloskey's true story has paradigm-shifting power for a
different reason. She asks us to imagine what most of us will never
experience-"crossing over" from one gender to another. And during that
moment when we are standing in her high-heeled shoes,7s she asks us to
imagine how the law would have to be changed in order to ensure equality for
transgendered people.76 One option, of course, would be to characterize
discrimination against transgendered people as a form of "sex" or "gender"
discrimination.77 But Iowa led the country in rejecting that approach.78 Another
option would be to characterize discrimination (by "state actors") against
transgendered people as a denial of equal protection.79 But in the imagined
words of Justice Thomas: "The Constitution of the United States does not
mention a right to be weird.,,80 Yet another option would be to enact a
nondiscrimination statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of "gender 
identity."s1 Although such nondiscrimination provisions have been adopted by
the University of Iowa and the City of Iowa City,82 no such legislation has even
been proposed, much less enacted, in most jurisdictions.83 Transgendered
74. Brown, supra note 8, at 59.
75. McCloskey, supra note 7.
76. [d. 
77. See, e.g., Maffei v. Kolaeton, 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding that 
discrimination against a transsexual is discrimination on the basis of "sex" under New York City law). 
78. Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 337 N.W.2d 470 (Iowa 1983) (applying state law). 
See also Ulane v. Eastem Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying Title VB law). Other
federal circuits considering the issue in Ulane have reached the same result as the Seventh Circuit.
Sommers v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
566 F.2d 659, 663 (9th Cir. 1977).
79. See, e.g., Holloway, 566 F.2d at 663 (stating in dictum that transsexuals are not a "suspect
class" under the fourteenth amendment).
80. McCloskey, supra note 7, at 77.
8I. For example, the Nondiscrimination Statement adopted by the University of Iowa states:
The University of Iowa prohibits discrimination in employment or in its educational programs
and activities on the basis ofrace, national origin, color, creed, religion, sex, age, disability,
veteran status, sexual orientation, gender identity, or associational preference.
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, OPERATIONS MANUAL ch. 6 (1998).
82. For the text of the University of Iowa's nondiscrimination policy, see supra note 81; IOWA
CITY, lowA, CITY CODE title 2 (I998).
83. The Employment Nondiscrimination Act of 1994, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong., for example,
proposed a prohibition on discrimination on the basis of "sexual orientation," but made no reference to
discrimination on the basis of "gender identification."
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people are about as far "outside" the law as you can get in th.e United States
today.84 Therefore, Dierdre McCloskey's story is particularly compelling. It
challenges us, as lawyers, to rededicate ourselves to a vision of law as "a force 
for multivocality, for the acknowledgment of the other,,,8S because otherwise
law will be an instrument of "bureaucratic and theoretical power,,86-an
instrument of violence. 
I want to close my remarks on the value of narrative by shifting from the
realm of scholarship to the realm of the law school classroom.87 I also want to
shift from the realm of anti-discrimination law (where storytelling is common)
to the realm of tort law (where storytelling is rare). This will be a "true story"
about myself. The events took place over twenty years ago, when I was a young
torts professor in a commuting marriage at the University of California-Davis.
I was raped at 4:00 a.m. by a stranger who entered the bedroom of my Davis
apartment, where I slept by myself during the week. I called the police and they
interviewed me, but they never found the rapist. At 10:00 a.m. that morning, I
was standing in front of my torts class. The topic? Whether it was defamatory
to make a false identification of a woman as a rape victim.88 The casebook's
answer? Yes.89 
I tried to recall what I used to say about the issue. Is it really harmful to a
woman's reputation to make a false statement that she has been raped? Why?
Because she is no longer a virgin? Because she is now "damaged goods"? I
tried to recall what my students used to say in class about this issue. Did they
think the law of defamation should continue to provide a cause of action for
falsely-accused plaintiffs so long as some significant segment of the population
continues to shun rape victims? Or did they think it was no longer defamatory
to describe a woman as a rape victim? I could not remember. Rather, I now saw
this body of law through a new set of lenses-through the eyes of a rape victim.
I have no idea what I did in that class, except that I made it through without
crying. But the next year I told my class that I had been raped, and instead of 
84. McCloskey, supra note 7.
85. Id at 81.
86. Id at 82.
87. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal 
Education or "The Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGALEDUC. 61,80 (1988) (giving examples
of feminist law teachers who have brought personal stories into the classroom to enrich discussion of 
cases); see also Stephanie M: Wildman, The Question ofSilence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class
Participation, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147, 152 (1998) (sharing personal experience in classroom to help
empower the silenced).
88. Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 T.L.R. 581 (CA 1934). The
plaintiff; a Russian princess, claimed that the defendant's motion picture defamed her by portraying her
as a woman who had been raped by Rasputin, a Russian monk.
89. JAMESAHENDERSON,JR.Er AL., THETORTSPROCESS 876 (4th ed. 1994) (explaining that the
Youssoupoifcourt held that the statements caused the plaintiffto be "shunned").
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spending five minutes on the issue (as I had in the past), we spent over thirty
minutes talking first about society's perception of rape victims, and then about
the relationship between the manner in which rape statutes are administered and
the manner in which rape victims are regarded by the general public. We asked
ourselves, "Is it the rape victim who should be shunned, or is it the rapist?!" At
the same time, we asked ourselves, "If society still shuns rape victims, then
shouldn't we allow a woman who has been falsely identified as a rape victim
to sue for defamation?" In the end, the class talked about the proper sequence
for legal reform in this area, realizing that reform in the enforcement of rape
laws would have to precede any proposed reform in the law of defamation.
Now that you have heard Dorothy Brown's "fictionalized" narrative,
Dierdre McCloskey's "true" story, and my "true" story, do you think that there
is a value in hearing "paradigm-shifting" narratives, either in legal scholarship
or in the classroom? I certainly hope so. It seems to me that when we are able
to examine the law from such different perspectives as those of a black female
law professor, a transgendered economics professor, and a torts professor who
has been a victim of rape, our understanding of the law is deepened and our 
ability to cope with the complexities of legal reform is heightened. Surely, if 
there is any profession that benefits from the expression of diverse viewpoints,
it is the legal profession, and "outsider" narratives are an excellent vehicle for
enabling legal reformers to hear previously-excluded voices.
